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Lowball Guidance 
 
Abstract 
Lowball guidance is the practice of firm managers issuing overly cautious guidance that is later 
exceeded by a wide margin at the earnings announcement. It has been the subject of debates 
among investors, analysts, and the media, while based only on anecdotes of a few high-profile 
firms. We conduct a large-sample study to develop an intuitive, empirical definition to identify 
and examine this practice. We assess its prevalence in a broad sample of firms and provide 
evidence consistent with two drivers of lowball guidance: firms’ unexpectedly high growth and 
firms’ attempt to appease sell-side analysts and institutional investors. Our results indicate that 
issuing overly cautious guidance likely appeals to certain types of market participants in the short 
term, but it is not a sustainable practice. 
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1. Introduction 
Earnings guidance is a controversial practice. Calls to cease this practice have come from 
prominent investors such as Warren Buffett, CEOs including James Dimon of JPMorgan Chase, 
as well as some academics, because it allegedly creates unhealthy market pressure and emphasis 
on pursuing short-term profits (Hsieh et al. 2006; Fuller and Jensen 2010; Rapaport 2018). Yet, 
some CEOs and CFOs find it necessary to set reasonable market expectations, and research has 
shown that guidance can be beneficial in enhancing stock liquidity, reducing stock volatility, and 
resolving earnings uncertainty (e.g., Graham et al. 2005; Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Beyer et al. 
2010; Chen et al. 2011; Balakrishnan et al. 2014; Billings et al. 2015). 
Amid this debate, one particular type of guidance has received much attention—guidance 
that is overly cautious such that a firm can easily beat it when announcing earnings. Critics of 
this practice claim that firms try to fool the market into believing extremely low expectations and 
then beat these expectations by a wide margin to artificially boost stock prices. This practice, 
thus, has been labelled “lowballing” or “lowball guidance.” The poster child of lowballing is 
Apple Inc., which for about a decade starting in the early 2000’s consistently exceeded its 
guidance by a wide margin, and ironically, emerges as one of the largest U.S. companies today 
by market capitalization. 
In this study, we seek to systematically analyze the practice of lowball guidance by 
shedding light on the following related research questions: 1) how prevalent is this practice, 2) 
why do firms do it, 3) when do they quit lowballing, and 4) how does it appeal to the investment 
community of institutional investors and sell-side analysts? These questions are of interest to 
firm managers who engage in or are considering this practice and to capital market participants 
who follow these firms, as well as to academics seeking to understand the motives behind such a 
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seemingly unsustainable disclosure practice. While we remain agnostic about the overall merits 
of the “guidance game” and acknowledge that many of the determinants and market implications 
of the general practice of guidance (and its many properties) have been examined in prior studies 
(e.g., Hutton 2005; Yang 2012; Hilary et al. 2014), we contend that lowball guidance remains an 
interesting issue and a subject relevant to both practitioners and researchers, and it has not been 
thoroughly investigated in any prior study. 
Lowball guidance is a special case of management guidance, which is a common form of 
voluntary disclosure by public firms. Theories and empirical evidence abound in prior research 
on why firms provide voluntary disclosure in general and guidance in particular (e.g., Verrecchia 
2001; Healy and Palepu 2001; Kothari 2001; Beyer et al. 2010). Thus, conditional on a firm’s 
decision to provide guidance, we draw from studies on asymmetric market responses to earnings 
surprises as a guiding framework to better understand lowball guidance. Given the litigation risk 
from shareholder lawsuits associated with steep stock price declines (Skinner 1994, 1997), and 
that stock prices tend to decline more for earnings misses than they rise for the same level of 
earnings beats (Skinner and Sloan 2002), firms naturally tend to be cautious with their guidance. 
But the degree of caution is likely to vary over time and across firms, and we conjecture that it 
varies with the composition of the firm’s investor base and confidence in predicting future 
growth. For example, firms are likely less cautious when growth is predictable and investors are 
largely long-term holders, while they may be overly cautious when growth is highly uncertain 
and investors are largely short-term investors. Therefore, under this framework, we focus on two 
possible explanations, mutually non-exclusive, for why some firms are overly cautious and 
provide lowball guidance. 
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First, firm managers might have genuine difficulty in forecasting next quarter’s earnings 
because the firm’s operations are uncertain or volatile, especially when coupled with 
exceptionally high growth in sales or profitability. As a result, guidance that was intended to be 
slightly cautious at issuance may turn out to be overly cautious upon the announcement of actual 
earnings. This scenario suggests that lowballing is unintentional and, even if it may occur over 
four or more consecutive quarters, is an artifact of higher-than-expected earnings growth. We 
refer to this as the “unexpected growth” explanation. 
The second possible explanation is that firm managers deliberately provide guidance they 
expect their firms to exceed by a wide margin, likely in an attempt to appease existing analysts 
and institutional investors and to attract new ones. It is well documented that many analysts and 
institutional investors are fixated on whether firms achieve their quarterly earnings targets (e.g., 
Matsumoto 2002; Bartov et al. 2002). Thus, although there is nothing dishonest or illegal about 
this practice, it is intended to appease capital markets participants’ desire for consistent delivery 
of earnings that exceed expectations. We refer to this as the “market appeasement” explanation. 
Because there is no consensus definition of lowball guidance in practice or prior research, 
we begin our analysis by developing an empirical definition of lowball guidance, or more 
specifically, lowball firms. Through reading many business press articles, we recognize a 
number of high-profile firms that have been mentioned as having a reputation for giving lowball 
guidance. All of these firms have established a track record of providing quarterly earnings-per-
share (EPS) guidance and then beating it by a wide margin.1 As the director of research at First 
Call put it, “lowballing is a tempting thing to do because for the first three or four quarters, you 
                                                 
1 We define “earnings beats” relative to firms’ own guidance rather than the analyst consensus forecast, as the latter 
is not directly under managers’ control. This design choice is based on the common notion that lowball firms 
deliberately issue guidance substantially below their expected earnings; thus, comparing actual earnings to earnings 
guidance is more appropriate than to analyst consensus forecast. Later in this paper, we explore how lowball 
guidance relates to meeting and beating analyst consensus forecasts. 
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look like a hero,” suggesting that such a practice becomes recognized after several quarters 
(Lahart 1999). To capture the key features of EPS beats over consecutive quarters, we define a 
lowball firm as one whose reported EPS has exceeded its own guidance by at least $0.05 for at 
least four consecutive quarters. The choice of $0.05 is partly based on ample empirical evidence 
that market participants gravitate towards EPS expectations rounded to increments of five cents 
for various reasons and motives (Herrmann and Thomas 2005; Bamber et al. 2010; Cheong and 
Thomas 2011; Dechow and You 2012). Hence, a $0.05 EPS beat (at least four times) is a 
reasonable hurdle for our purpose; this definition identifies approximately 11 percent of our 
sample firms as lowball firms during our sample period of 2001-2017. Besides Apple, our 
definition also identifies several other well-known firms such as Netflix, LinkedIn, Qualcomm, 
Target, Marriott, Proctor and Gamble, and General Motors. We acknowledge that our definition 
is inevitably subjective, but the fact that many well-known lowball firms are identified suggests 
that it is a suitable one. 
We conduct both cross-sectional and time-series analyses to investigate which firms 
lowball and when they start lowballing. We find evidence for both explanations. Compared with 
non-lowball firms, lowball firms tend to have higher prior sales growth, higher earnings growth, 
and more volatile earnings, consistent with the unexpected growth explanation. Lowball firms 
also tend to have higher prior analyst coverage and ownership by transient institutional investors 
(Bushee 1998), consistent with the market appeasement explanation. In an analysis of 
institutional ownership and analyst coverage subsequent to initiating lowballing, we find that 
ownership by transient investors increases after a firm adopts a lowball policy, consistent with 
transient investors being more concerned than other types of institutional investors about firms’ 
short-term achievement of earnings expectations. 
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To better understand firms’ decisions on lowball guidance, for the set of firms that have 
been identified to have lowballed for at least one episode (i.e., a minimum of four consecutive 
quarters), we investigate the duration of their lowball guidance practice, as well as the factors 
that appear to lead to an end of this practice. We find substantial variation in lowball duration, 
with the weighted-average at about seven to eight quarters. After that, the lowball practice 
typically ends when a firm either begins to exceed its guidance by only a small margin, miss its 
guidance (i.e., fail to meet), or stops providing guidance altogether. Consistent with the 
unexpected growth explanation, we find that terminations of lowball guidance are associated 
with contemporaneous declines in sales and earnings growth. Also consistent with the market 
appeasement explanation, terminations due to stoppage of providing guidance altogether are 
associated with contemporaneous declines in analyst coverage. 
To shed further light on the lowball phenomenon, we examine how lowballing is related 
to meeting or beating analyst consensus forecasts. Our results indicate that lowball firms are 
more likely to meet or beat analyst consensus immediately after starting lowball guidance, 
relative to matched non-lowball firms. Then, after four quarters, lowball firms become less likely 
to meet or beat analyst consensus relative to non-lowball firms. Our results suggest that during 
the initial lowball guidance period, analysts do not fully understand that the guidance is overly 
cautious, and therefore, their consensus tends to be sufficiently low for firms’ actual earnings to 
exceed. After analysts learn to adjust their forecasts higher, it becomes more difficult for lowball 
firms to meet or beat the analyst consensus relative to non-lowball firms. 
In market return tests, we examine whether lowball firms experience higher returns than 
non-lowball firms. We find that returns are higher for lowball firms during the four consecutive 
quarters of large earnings beats, but not during the prior or subsequent 12-month periods. The 
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results are consistent using annual, quarterly, abnormal, or raw returns, and after controlling for 
the amount of earnings news within each quarter. These results suggest that there is a temporary 
capital market benefit to providing lowball guidance. 
We conduct additional tests to ensure that our results are robust to different empirical 
design choices. When we alter the definition of lowball guidance to require a larger EPS beat or 
when the upper bound (rather than the midpoint) of guidance range is used as the benchmark, the 
results remain similar to our main results. The results are also slightly stronger when we match 
two control firms for each lowball firm, compared with one-to-one matching in the main tests. 
Our study makes several contributions. First, our study sheds light on a particular form of 
earnings guidance practice that has been the subject of debates among investors, analysts, and the 
media. Much of those commentaries are based only on anecdotes from a few high-profile firms. 
Our study is the first to draw inferences from systematic large-sample analyses. We develop an 
intuitive, practitioner-oriented approach to identifying lowball firms, document the prevalence of 
the practice, and propose two explanations. Second, we add to several streams of literature on 
quarterly guidance (e.g., Houston et al. 2010; Chen et al. 2011), expectation management (e.g., 
Richardson et al. 2004; Cotter et al. 2006), and disclosure preferences of institutional investors 
(e.g., Healy et al. 1999; Bushee and Noe 2000). Our results indicate that overly cautious 
guidance appeals to certain types of institutional investors in the short term, but it is not 
sustainable and typically ends within two years. Hence, our study informs firm managers of the 
pros and cons of such a practice and alerts capital market participants of the ephemeral nature of 
lowball guidance. 
Like many other studies in this field, our study is subject to some caveats and limitations. 
First, the vast literature on guidance has examined some properties of guidance that are related to 
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lowball guidance, such as the routine issuance of earnings guidance over consecutive quarters by 
many firms (Rogers and Van Buskirk 2013) and consistent biases in guidance over consecutive 
quarters by some firms (Hilary et al. 2014). But no prior study has examined lowballing using as 
large of a sample as ours, despite its extensive prevalence.2 Thus we believe a comprehensive 
study of lowball guidance is not only warranted but also relevant. Second, our definition of 
lowball firms inevitably retains elements of subjectivity, despite being guided by practitioners’ 
notions in various business press and based on empirical evidence on market participants’ 
proclivities towards five-cent increments. We believe our robustness checks using alternative 
definitions of lowball guidance mitigate this concern. Third, while we control for a myriad of 
factors and use a matched-sample design, our analyses of the associations between lowball 
guidance and determinants and market implications do not test causality. Thus, our results should 
be interpreted with this caveat in mind. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we provide institutional 
background information and explanations for lowballing. We then describe our data and sample 
in Section 3. Section 4 presents our empirical analyses and results. We conclude in section 5. 
2. Institutional Background and Explanations for Lowballing 
To the best of our knowledge, the term “lowball” was first used within the context of 
guidance in an online article at TheStreet.com (Lahart 1999), in which the director of research of 
First Call was quoted as saying “lowballing is a tempting thing to do because, for the first three 
or four quarters, you look like a hero.” His remark suggested that lowball guidance is a practice 
managers desire in the short term, but the market is likely to recognize it after a few quarters. 
                                                 
2 Using IBES data, we find that the percentage of U.S. firms providing EPS guidance has declined from 29% to 22% 
from 2001 to 2017, but as much as half of all these EPS guiders were lowball firms at some point. We posit that one 
reason for such prevalence of lowball guidance among EPS guiders is that, notwithstanding strong calls to eliminate 
guidance, firm managers choose to maintain guidance with a more cautious spin.  
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Since then, a number of high-profile firms have been recognized as “lowball” firms by 
the business press. Apple Inc. is often portrayed as the poster child of lowballing as it has 
consistently exceeded its guidance by a wide margin for nearly a decade starting in the early 
2000’s. By our estimates, Apple beat its own EPS guidance in all 39 quarters between 2003Q3 
and 2013Q1 by an average of $0.79 per share.3 Other well-known lowball firms include Netflix, 
Qualcomm, LinkedIn, and Boeing. For these and other firms, the business press has suggested 
that their guidance is “comically low” or a “ploy” (Yarow 2013; Columbus Dispatch 2009). 
Lowball guidance is a form of quarterly earnings guidance, which has been criticized for 
inducing managers to focus on achieving short-term quarterly targets at the expense of long term 
value, thus fostering managerial myopia (Fuller and Jensen 2010). Partly due to such criticism, in 
the mid-2000s, some firms discontinued quarterly guidance, prompted by heightened earnings 
uncertainty and deteriorating performance (Houston et al. 2010, Chen et al. 2011). To partially 
offset the lost information from discontinued quarterly guidance, more firms started to issue 
annual guidance with quarterly updates (Tang, Yao, and Zarowin 2018). Nonetheless, quarterly 
guidance remains common among firms issuing guidance. 
Prior research has not specifically examined lowball guidance, but the general form of 
guidance has been the subject of a large literature because it has been found to be a primary 
source of financial information (e.g., Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Beyer et al. 2010). Several 
defining features of lowball guidance, such as being consistently cautious over consecutive 
quarters and being issued regularly in conjunction with quarterly earnings announcements, have 
been studied in prior research. For example, the likelihood of guidance being issued concurrently 
with earnings announcements has increased over time and is positively correlated with the 
                                                 
3 Apple stopped issuing EPS guidance in 2013Q2, and instead started to provide guidance for revenue, gross margin, 
operating expenses, other income or expense.  
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presence of conference calls (Rogers and Van Buskirk 2013). Moreover, guidance issued with a 
predictable bias has been shown to be more informative to sophisticated investors than guidance 
issued with a smaller but less predictable error (Hilary et al. 2014). It is also well documented 
that managers issue quarterly guidance to manage or “walk down” analyst expectations 
downward to achievable levels (Richardson et al. 2004, Cotter et al. 2006), especially if the firm 
has already met or beat analyst expectations for past consecutive quarters (Kross et al. 2011).  
What distinguishes lowball guidance from these previously-examined general properties 
of guidance is its repeated and large magnitude of outperformance of reported actual earnings 
relative to the guidance. When the magnitude of guidance error is large, disclosure theory 
suggests that guidance credibility will be reduced (Stocken 2000), especially when such large 
error recurs on a regular basis. Empirical evidence also supports this prediction (Williams 1996, 
Rogers and Stocken 2005). Thus, assuming market participants (such as analysts and investors) 
update their assessment of guidance credibility in a Bayesian fashion, we expect them to be 
aware of firms’ lowball guidance and take measures to adjust the expected errors when they react 
to lowball guidance. However, if investors and analysts fully adjust the expected errors, it begs 
the question of why firms issue lowball guidance in the first place. Thus, it is intriguing but also 
puzzling as to why lowball guidance exists, as there seem to be no sustainable long-term benefits 
for issuing lowball guidance. Nevertheless, we conjecture that, in the short-term, two mutually 
non-exclusive potential reasons may explain the lowball guidance phenomenon. 
The first explanation is that firm managers might have genuine difficulty in forecasting 
the upcoming quarterly earnings if the firm’s operations are uncertain or volatile, especially 
during periods of high growth in sales and profitability. For example, unexpected revenue 
growth across product lines and geographic segments, favorable mix shift towards higher margin 
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products, lower input costs, and improved manufacturing and operational efficiencies can all 
contribute to actual reported earnings far exceeding beginning-of-the-period guidance provided 
to capital markets. In such cases, guidance intended to be slightly cautious at issuance is likely to 
turn out to be overly cautious upon the announcement of actual earnings. This explanation 
suggests that lowballing is largely unintentional and is an artifact of higher-than-expected sales 
and earnings growth. While unpredictability can lead realized earnings to be higher or lower than 
guidance, we focus only on the upside unpredictability in explaining lowball guidance. We refer 
to this as the “unexpected growth” explanation for brevity. 
The unexpected growth explanation, or specifically managers’ tendencies to be cautious 
with public guidance, relates to certain prior research. First, it is known that the payoff to 
guidance error is asymmetric in the sense that overestimating earnings tends to be punished more 
severely by the markets than underestimating earnings (e.g., Skinner and Sloan 2002). There are 
also greater litigation concerns when bad news is delayed than when good news is delayed 
(Skinner 1994; 1997). Thus, when facing a wider distribution of expected future earnings, 
managers would rationally choose to publicly disclose a forecast at the lower end of such 
distribution to minimize the expected penalty from misestimating. As a result, the likelihood of 
underestimating earnings increases with earnings unpredictability, as the unexpected growth 
explanation predicts. Second, lowball guidance is related to another phenomenon in which 
managers issue guidance that differs from actual earnings with a consistent and predictable error. 
Hilary et al. (2014) show that such guidance is usually issued with a downward bias and 
generates greater market reaction compared with guidance with a less consistent error. While one 
may view lowball guidance as a form of consistent guidance error, the “unexpected growth” 
explanation, however, does not fit well with the consistent guidance error phenomenon 
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documented by Hilary et al (2014). This is because earnings unpredictability reduces managers’ 
ability to imbed a consistent error in their guidance, while it increases the likelihood of 
lowballing as we explained earlier. 4  Thus, evidence supporting the unexpected growth 
explanation also supports the point that lowball guidance is a different phenomenon than the 
consistent guidance phenomenon in Hilary et al. (2014). 
The second explanation for lowball guidance is that firm managers deliberately provide 
guidance that they expect their firms to exceed by a wide margin. While such actions may be 
intended to trigger a stock price jump at the earnings announcement, a more plausible, deeper 
motive is to appease existing analysts and institutional investors and to attract new analysts and 
investors. It is well documented that many analysts and institutional investors are fixated on 
whether firms achieve quarterly earnings targets (e.g., Matsumoto 2002; Bartov et al. 2002). 
There is also evidence that some institutional investors prefer firms that achieve near-term 
earnings over longer-term targets (Bushee 2001). Thus, there is nothing dishonest or illegal about 
this practice, which is intended to appease capital markets participants’ desire for consistent 
delivery of quarterly earnings that exceed expectations. We refer to this motive as the “market 
appeasement” explanation. 
It is important to note that these two explanations are mutually non-exclusive and likely 
coexist across different firms over various times. Therefore we test each explanation both in the 
time series and in the cross section. 
3. Data and Sample 
We obtain quarterly earnings-per-share (EPS) guidance data from the Thomson Reuters 
IBES Guidance Detail file. Starting with all point and range forecasts from 2001Q1 to 2017Q4, 
                                                 
4  Using our sample, we compare the standard deviation of management guidance errors between lowball and 
matched non-lowball firms. Consistent with our argument, we find greater volatility in guidance errors by lowball 
firms than by non-lowball firms (p<0.01).  
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we select our sample as follows. First, we eliminate any guidance issued after the end of the 
guided fiscal quarter as they are usually considered earnings pre-announcements or warnings 
rather than guidance for market expectations (Houston et al. 2010; Kross et al. 2011). Second, 
we require that the guidance be issued during the guided quarter rather than in advance, thus to 
ensure that all guidance in our sample are comparable and issued for the upcoming quarter. 
Third, if multiple guidance exist for the same quarter, we retain only the last guidance so as not 
to misclassify non-lowball firms that correct their cautious guidance with a within-quarter 
revision. Fourth, we require sufficient data in the IBES Detail History file, Compustat, and 
CRSP, in order to compare guidance with actual reported EPS and to run our empirical tests. 
Fifth, we eliminate firms with guidance or actual reported EPS in any quarter larger than $20 to 
reduce the effects of extreme observations. Sixth, we eliminate firms that have never issued any 
quarterly EPS guidance for the entire sample period from 2001 to 2017, and we keep all firm-
quarters (with or without quarterly guidance) for firms that issued guidance at least once during 
the sample period. Our final sample consists of 118,099 firm-quarter observations from 2,953 
unique firms. Table 1 provides details of the sample selection process. 
3.1 Identification of Lowball Firms 
 Although bias and pessimism in guidance have been examined in some prior research 
(e.g., Hilary et al. 2014), to our knowledge, no prior study has specifically examined lowball 
guidance, which has been discussed primarily in practitioner-oriented media and publications. 
Hence, to conduct formal analyses, we start by developing a procedure to identify lowball firms, 
guided by practitioner-oriented articles. We search for and read numerous articles in the business 
press about firms that have gained a reputation for providing lowball guidance. We find articles 
about high-profile lowball firms such as Apple, Netflix, Qualcomm, LinkedIn, and Boeing. 
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These articles commonly discuss a firm’s own guidance for quarterly or annual EPS issued early 
in the forecast period, followed by an actual reported EPS that far exceeded its guidance, as well 
as quotes from institutional investors or sell-side analysts about the firm’s reputation for 
lowballing. While sometimes the articles also mention how a firm’s actual EPS compares with 
analysts’ consensus forecasts, the reference to lowballing is primarily concerning the firm’s 
actual EPS beating the firm’s own guidance. The articles also typically mention that the firm has 
a consistent history of providing lowball guidance and large earnings beats. After surveying 
these business press articles, we operationalize our definition of a lowball firm as one that has 
reported actual EPS that exceeded guidance by at least $0.05 for four consecutive quarters. For 
firms that provided range guidance, we use the midpoint value to compute the earnings beat.5  
Although the choice of $0.05 may seem arbitrary, there is ample empirical evidence that 
market participants gravitate towards EPS expectations rounded to increments of five cents for a 
number of reasons and incentives. Herrmann and Thomas (2005) document that some sell-side 
analysts round their forecasts due to limited resources or less effort, a conclusion also concurred 
by Dechow and You (2012). Bamber et al. (2010) show that analysts’ tendencies to round to the 
nearest nickel are in part influenced by firm managers’ tendencies to do the same.6 Cheong and 
Thomas (2011) find that firm managers and analysts’ EPS forecast errors do not vary with the 
magnitude or the scale of EPS, and a large portion of these forecast errors are about five cents. 
Given the body of evidence, we believe that a $0.05 EPS beat is a reasonable cutoff for our 
purposes.7 
                                                 
5 Our inferences remain unchanged if we use the upper bound instead (Ciconte, Kirk and Tucker 2011).  
6 Bamber et al. (2010) argue that managers do so due to a heuristic response to uncertainty, as well as optimism, and 
efforts to protect the firm’s proprietary information. 
7 Empirically, a one-time five-cent beat is not an easy or frequent occurrence, let alone four in a row. A frequency 
analysis based on I/B/E/S data on quarterly EPS guidance and actuals reveals that a one-cent beat is most common, 
which occurs in 13.4% of observations. The next most common occurrences are a two-cent beat (11.8%), three-cent 
beat (9.5%), an exact meet (7.9%), a four-cent beat (7.0%), a one-cent miss (6.2%), and then a five-cent beat (5.3%). 
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 To illustrate our identification procedure, consider the following example. If Firm A beat 
its guidance by $0.05 or more in each of the four quarters in 2001, then we identify Firm A as a 
lowball firm after the fourth quarter of 2001. Using this method, we identify Apple as a lowball 
firm after the second quarter of 2005, Netflix after the second quarter of 2010, Qualcomm after 
the third quarter of 2015, and LinkedIn after the first quarter of 2016. However, our method does 
not identify Boeing as a lowball firm because Boeing does not provide quarterly EPS guidance, 
but instead, provides only annual EPS guidance. We acknowledge that our definition of lowball 
firms is inevitably subjective, but the fact that our method successfully identified most of the 
firms mentioned in the business press articles as lowball firms suggests that it is a reasonable 
one. 
 In total, we identify 329 firms, or 11.1 percent of our sample, as lowball firms at some 
point during our sample period. Figure 1 illustrates the number of newly-identified lowball firms 
in each quarter, with a median of four and a high of 16 in 2009Q4. It is notable that the financial 
crisis in late 2008 and early 2009 likely led many firms to issue overly cautious guidance during 
that time, which was then beaten by a large margin. According to our method, these firms would 
be identified as lowball firms sometime between 2009Q4 and 2010Q4. Figure 1 shows this 
scenario, as there are 57 lowball firms identified during this period. Figure 2 shows the 
cumulative number of lowball firms each quarter; the median is 21 and the high is 48 in 2010Q2. 
It also appears that the number of lowball firms has risen steadily to exceed the median over the 
last five years of the sample period (2013-2017), suggesting that the lowball phenomenon has 
become increasingly relevant in recent years.8 
                                                                                                                                                             
Furthermore, 70.8% of observations are below a five-cent beat. Hypothetically, in a random draw, the probability of 
four consecutive quarters of at least a five-cent beat would be (0.292)4 = 0.0073 or 0.73%. 
8 Data requirements for all variables reduce the sample size of lowball firms in subsequent regressions. Results in 
Tables 2 and 3 are based on 301 lowball firms, and results in Table 4 are based on 253 lowball firms. 
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3.2 Lowball Firms that Stop Lowballing 
 To better understand firms’ lowball decisions, we examine whether and when lowball 
firms stop providing lowball guidance. We define three scenarios in which the lowball guidance 
pattern stops. The first is when a firm stops providing guidance altogether. The second is when a 
firm disappoints the market by failing to meet its guidance. Third, we consider the scenario in 
which a firm beats its guidance by less than $0.05 for two or more consecutive quarters. 
Although the criterion of two or more consecutive quarters is based on our discretion, we make 
this design choice to avoid misclassifying lowball firms that incidentally experienced a small 
beat for only one quarter.  
 We find that, on average, lowball firms maintain the pattern of beating guidance by at 
least $0.05 for seven to eight quarters, but there is significant variation in the duration of lowball 
episodes. About a quarter of the lowball firms maintain it for only four quarters, while about a 
tenth of the firms maintain it for more than three years. Eventually, however, almost all lowball 
firms (293 out of 329) stop the pattern. Among these firms, we find that 74 firms stopped giving 
guidance at one point, 117 firms disappointed the market by missing their guidance, and 102 
firms started to beat their guidance by less than $0.05 for two or more consecutive quarters. We 
provide additional analyses on firms’ ending of lowball guidance in Section 4.3. 
4. Empirical Analyses and Results 
In this section we present our empirical analyses and results. Section 4.1 examines the 
determinants of lowball guidance using both time-series and cross-sectional analyses. Section 4.2 
evaluates the market implication of lowball guidance. Section 4.3 studies the termination of 
lowball guidance. Section 4.4 investigates how lowball guidance is associated with the likelihood 
of meeting and beating analyst consensus. Section 4.5 examines whether lowballing is associated 
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with better stock performance than matched non-lowball firms. Section 4.6 presents robustness 
tests.  
4.1 Determinants of Lowball Guidance 
We conduct both cross-sectional and time-series analyses to investigate which types of 
firms provide lowball guidance and when they start lowballing. We begin with time-series 
analyses, where we compare lowball firms with themselves before and after initiating lowball 
guidance, identified using the method described in Section 3. We then conduct cross-sectional 
analyses, where we match lowball firms to non-lowball firms by year, industry, and firm size. 
Both sets of analyses shed light from different perspectives on the two explanations for lowball 
guidance proposed in Section 2. 
4.1.1 Time-Series Regressions 
The purpose of the time-series analyses is to understand when firms initiate lowball 
guidance. We estimate the following logistic regression. 
Pr(LOWBALLi,t=1) = β0 + β1(SALESGRi,t) + β2(EARNGRi,t) + β3(EARNVOLi,t)  
+ β4(ANALYSTCOVi,t) + β5(PIH_TRAi,t) + β6(PIH_DEDi,t)  
+ β7(PIH_QIXi,t) + β8(SIZEi,t) + β9(ROAi,t) + β10(LEVERAGEi,t)  
+ β11(BTMi,t) + β12(SEOi,t) + β13(M&Ai,t) + β14(RDINTENSEi,t) 
+ β15(IFIRST_GUIDEi,t) + Industry Fixed Effects + ɛi,t                                      (1) 
 
To ease exposition, we refer to the four consecutive quarters of beating guidance by at least 
$0.05 as period t, and the four prior quarters as period t-1. We compare a lowball firm in period t 
to itself from period t-1. We believe this is a powerful setting as lowball firms chose to lowball 
during period t but not during period t-1, and hence, the comparison helps identify the time-
specific factors that change the firms’ lowball choice from period t-1 to period t. 
 The dependent variable, LOWBALLi,t, is set to one for lowball firm i in the lowball period 
t, and zero for the non-lowball period t-1. The first set of independent variables are motivated by 
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the unexpected growth explanation for lowball guidance as discussed in Section 2. Under this 
explanation, firms are more likely to issue lowball guidance when they are growing rapidly but 
with high uncertainty. We measure a firm’s growth using SALESGR and EARNGR, defined as 
seasonal growth in sales and earnings (income before extraordinary items), respectively, 
averaged over the four quarters of period t and period t-1.9 We measure the unpredictability of 
growth using EARNVOL, calculated as the standard deviation of quarterly reported earnings 
during the prior five years. The unexpected growth explanation predicts positive coefficients on 
SALESGR, EARNGR, and EARNVOL. 
The second set of independent variables are motivated by the market appeasement 
explanation for lowball guidance, also discussed in Section 2. Under this explanation, firms are 
more likely to issue lowball guidance when they have higher analyst coverage and institutional 
ownership. We measure analyst coverage using ANALYSTCOV, which is the log of one plus the 
number of unique analysts who issued an EPS forecast for the firm during the fiscal quarter, 
averaged over the four quarters of period t and period t-1. We measure institutional ownership 
using PIH, which is the percentage of common shares outstanding held by institutional investors 
as of the end of the latest calendar quarter, averaged over period t and t-1. The market 
appeasement explanation predicts positive coefficients on the analyst coverage and institutional 
ownership variables. 
Following Bushee (1998, 2001), we also partition the ownership by institutional investors 
into three types: transient, dedicated, and quasi-indexer (PIH_TRA, PIH_DED, and PIH_QIX). 
The relation between each type of institution and a firm’s disclosure strategy is typically not the 
same. Bushee and Noe (2000) show that transient institutions utilize short-term trading strategies 
                                                 
9 Because we require data for the four quarters in time period t, as well as the four quarters in time period t-1, we 
lose 28 lowball firms that have some missing data during the t-1 period. As a result, there are 301 lowball firms in 
the time-series regressions with 602 firm-period observations. 
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that benefit from more frequent firm disclosures, while dedicated institutions have longer-term 
horizons and have better access to private discussions with management and rely less on public 
disclosures. Quasi-indexers are more likely to use passive investment strategies and are also less 
reliant on guidance disclosures. Given these contrasting styles and preferences for public 
disclosures in general, and earnings guidance in particular, we expect lowball guidance to be 
positively related to the presence of transient institutions, and negatively related to dedicated and 
quasi-indexer institutions. 
We follow prior research and control for several factors that are likely associated with 
firms’ guidance choices (e.g., Lennox and Park 2006; Rogers et al. 2009). SIZE is the log of 
market capitalization, ROA is return on assets, defined as operating income divided by average 
total assets, LEVERAGE is the debt-to-equity ratio, and BTM is the book-to-market ratio of 
equity, averaged over the four quarters of period t and period t-1. To control for significant 
financing and investing activities that likely influence a firm’s disclosure practice (Frankel et al. 
1995), we include SEO and M&A, the average of the indicator variable of seasoned equity 
offering and merger and acquisition activities, respectively, over the four quarters of period t and 
period t-1. SEO is set to one if proceeds from the sale of common and preferred stock over the 
current and next three quarters are greater than ten percent of total assets at the beginning of the 
current quarter, and M&A is set to one if the amount spent on acquisitions over the current and 
next three quarters is greater than ten percent of total assets at the beginning of the current 
quarter. To control for firm complexity, which can lead to higher information asymmetry (Barth 
et al. 2001; Bushee et al. 2018), we include RDINTENSE, defined as R&D expense scaled by 
average total assets.10 We also include IFIRST_GUIDE, an indicator variable set to 1 if a firm is 
                                                 
10 Substituting other proxies for firm complexity such as the number of business and geographic segments (Huang et 
al. 2014) do not change the results or inferences for the variables of interest. 
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providing guidance for the first time during the first quarter of the four quarters of period t and 
period t-1, respectively, to test whether lowballing is related to first-time guidance. Lastly, we 
include industry fixed effects using the Fama-French 12 industry classification. The appendix 
includes detailed definitions for all variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st 
and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers, with the exception of earnings growth 
(EARNGR), which is winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles due to a small denominator 
problem.  
Table 2 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in Equation (1). The 
sample consists of 602 firm-periods, corresponding to 301 lowball firms in both periods t-1 and 
t. The median sales growth and earnings growth are 10.4 percent and 13.8 percent, indicating 
moderately high growth among sample firms. The median firm is covered by 10 analysts and 
82.9 percent of shares outstanding is held by institutional investors.  
 Table 2 Panel B reports the results from the time-series logistic regressions of Equation 
(1) with the institutional ownership aggregated (PIH) in Column (1) and partitioned into 
transient (PIH_TRA), dedicated (PIH_DED), and quasi-indexer (PIH_QIX) in Column (2). We 
report t-statistics in parentheses and cluster the standard errors by firm. The tests of significance 
are one-tailed for variables with directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. 11  In both 
columns, SALEGR, EARNGR, and EARNVOL are significantly positive at the 0.05 level or 
better, consistent with the unexpected growth explanation. To get a sense of the economic 
significance, the marginal effect of each variable, based on the coefficients in Column (1), is 
26.1, 2.8, and 10.6 percent, respectively; an interquartile shift in each variable would increase the 
probability of a firm to provide lowball guidance by 5.8, 2.6, and 1.9 percent, respectively, which 
is significant considering that 11.1 percent of the sample firms were identified as lowball firms. 
                                                 
11 In case of results contrary to directional predictions, two-tailed tests apply.  
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ANALYSTCOV is insignificant in both columns, which does not appear to support the market 
appeasement explanation, at least regarding sell-side analysts. PIH in Column (1) and PIH_TRA 
in Column (2) are significantly positive at the 0.10 level or better, which suggests that 
appeasement of institutional investors is a relevant factor. However, PIH_DED in Column (2) is 
significantly negative at the 0.1 level, indicating that firms tend to adopt a lowball guidance 
policy when transient investor ownership is high but not when dedicated institutional ownership 
is high. An interquartile shift in PIH_TRA (PIH_DED) would increase (decrease) the probability 
of a firm to provide lowball guidance by 4.6 (2.1) percent. The coefficient for PIH_QIX is 
insignificant. Overall, the time-series results provide some support for both explanations for why 
firms provide lowball guidance. 
Among the control variables, ROA is significantly positive in both columns, indicating 
that high profit firms are more likely to provide lowball guidance. M&A is significantly negative 
in both columns, suggesting that firms undergoing acquisitions are less likely to provide lowball 
guidance, consistent with findings from Frankel et al. (1995) that such firms are more likely to 
issue guidance that more accurately reflects subsequent actual reported earnings. 
4.1.2 Cross-Sectional Regressions 
To understand which firms are more likely to adopt lowball guidance, we estimate a 
cross-sectional regression similar to the time-series regression, except that we average all 
independent variables over the four quarters during period t. In addition, we include two extra 
variables to control for firm age and the fiscal fourth quarter. FIRMAGE is measured as the log 
of the number of years a firm has existed in the CRSP dataset, averaged over period t.12 FQ4 is 
an indicator variable set to 1 (0 otherwise) if the last of the four consecutive quarters during 
                                                 
12 We do not include FIRMAGE in our time-series regressions because this variable increases monotonically for all 
lowball firms when they shift from non-lowball period t-1 to lowball period t.  
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period t is the fiscal fourth quarter. We include the latter variable because Rangan and Sloan 
(1998) find that market analyses differ depending on whether four consecutive quarters are in the 
same fiscal year. For each lowball firm, we identify a control firm (i.e., a non-lowball firm 
throughout our sample period), matched by year, industry (Fama-French 12), and size (market 
capitalization).13  
Pr(LOWBALLi,t=1) = β0 + β1(SALESGRi,t) + β2(EARNGRi,t) + β3(EARNVOLi,t)  
+ β4(ANALYSTCOVi,t) + β5(PIH_TRAi,t) + β6(PIH_DEDi,t) + β7(PIH_QIXi,t) 
+ β8(SIZEi,t) + β9(ROAi,t) + β10(LEVERAGEi,t) + β11(BTMi,t) + β12(SEOi,t) 
+ β13(M&Ai,t) + β14(RDINTENSEi,t) + β15(IFIRST_GUIDEi,t) + β16(FIRMAGEi,t) 
+ β17(FQ4i,t) + Industry Fixed Effects + ɛi,t                                            (2) 
 
Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the cross-sectional regressions are shown in 
Table 3, Panel A. The sample consists of 602 firm-periods, corresponding to 301 lowball firms 
and 301 control (non-lowball) firms, all in period t. With the inclusion of control firms (non-
lowball firms), the median sales growth and earnings growth are 10.2 percent and 11.3 percent, 
slightly lower than the medians for only lowball firms in Table 2, Panel A. The median firm is 
covered by 10 analysts and 81.5 percent of shares outstanding are held by institutional investors. 
FQ4 has a mean of 0.304 for the pooled sample and 0.342 for lowball firms (unreported), 
suggesting that about 34% of lowball firms initiate lowballing from the first fiscal quarter. 
 Table 3 Panel B reports the results from the cross-sectional regressions of Equation (3) 
with the institutional ownership aggregated (PIH) in Column (1) and separated into transient 
(PIH_TRA), dedicated (PIH_DED), and quasi-indexer (PIH_QIX) in Column (2). We report t-
statistics in parentheses and cluster the standard errors by firm. In both columns, SALEGR, 
EARNGR, and EARNVOL are significantly positive at the 0.10 level or better, consistent with the 
unexpected growth explanation. ANALYSTCOV in Column (1) is positive and significant at the 
                                                 
13 As a robustness check, we also matched two control firms to each lowball guidance firm, with and without 
replacement. We find that the results are similar or slightly stronger than for those presented in Table 3, Panel B. 
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0.10 level, consistent with the market appeasement explanation that firms adopt lowball policies 
to attract or maintain the coverage of analysts. When PIH, significantly positive at the 0.05 level 
in Column (1), is partitioned into transient (PIH_TRA), dedicated (PIH_DED), and quasi-indexer 
(PIH_QIX) in Column (2), only PIH_TRA is significantly positive at the 0.01 level while the 
others are insignificant, suggesting that firms with high transient ownership tend to adopt a 
lowball guidance policy. Compared with the time-series results in Table 2, the cross-sectional 
results in Table 3 are similar in supporting the unexpected growth explanation and slightly 
stronger in supporting the market appeasement explanation. Taken together, our tests provide 
corroborating and supportive evidence for both explanations for why some firms provide lowball 
guidance at certain times. 
4.2 Implications of Lowball Guidance 
In this section, we examine the market implications of lowball guidance. Our reading of 
the business press articles suggests that financial analysts and institutional investors pay the most 
attention to firms’ lowball guidance practices. Thus, we focus on whether lowball guidance is 
associated with changes in institutional ownership and analyst coverage, as well as changes in 
analysts’ research outputs such as stock recommendations and earnings forecasts. Evidence of 
such associations would be consistent with the market appeasement explanation for lowball 
guidance. 
 We estimate the following OLS regression using a difference-in-difference design with 
the same set of lowball guidance firms and control firms from the cross-sectional analyses in the 
previous section.  
    Dep_Var,t = β0 + β1(LOWBALLi,t) + β2(POSTi,t) + β3(LOWBALL*POSTi,t) +  
β4(SALESGRi,t) + β5(ANALYSTCOVi,t or PIHi,t) + β6(SIZEi,t) +  β7(ROAi,t) +s 
β8(LEVERAGEi,t) + β9(BTMi,t) + β10(RDINTENSEi,t) + β11(FIRMAGEi,t) +  
β12(LOSSi,t) + β13(RET,t) + β14(VOLATILITYi,t) + β15(TURNOVERi,t) +  
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Industry Fixed Effects + ɛi,t              (3) 
 
The dependent variables include institutional ownership, analyst coverage, and analyst research 
output properties. The independent variable of interest is the interaction of two indicator 
variables: LOWBALL, set to one if a firm has been identified as a lowball firm, and POST, set to 
one for the four-quarter period t+1 after a firm is identified as a lowball firm and zero for the 
four-quarter period t. Similar to our cross-sectional tests, for each lowball firm, we identify a 
control firm (i.e., a non-lowball firm throughout our sample period), matched by year, industry, 
and size. LOWBALL is set to zero for control firms and POST is based on the year matched to the 
lowball firm. A significant coefficient (β3) for the interaction LOWBALL*POST would indicate 
that lowball firms experience a higher or lower level of the dependent variable after becoming a 
lowball firm, relative to non-lowball firms. 
 For institutional ownership as the dependent variable, we use PIH, measured as the 
percentage of common shares held by institutional investors, averaged over the four quarters 
during period t in the pre-period and during period t+1 in the post-period. Then we partition the 
institutional ownership by transient (PIH_TRA), dedicated (PIH_DED), and quasi-indexer 
(PIH_QIX), and use each as the dependent variable. If lowball firms are attempting to appease 
institutional investors, especially to transient institutional investors, then we expect the 
interaction LOWBALL*POST to be significantly positive. 
For analyst coverage as the dependent variable, we use ANALYSTCOV, as previously 
defined and averaged across period t in the pre-period and t+1 in the post-period.14 If firms 
provide lowball guidance to appease sell-side analysts, then we expect the coefficient for the 
interaction LOWBALL*POST to be significantly positive. 
                                                 
14 When institutional ownership is the dependent variable, we include analyst coverage as an independent variable. 
Similar, when analyst coverage, recommendations, and earnings forecast properties are the dependent variables, we 
include institutional ownership as an independent variable. 
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We measure the average recommendation issued by analysts for a given firm’s stock; 
MEANREC is the mean recommendation among analysts for a given firm immediately prior to 
an earnings announcement, where a higher value represents a more positive recommendation.15 
We also measure analyst forecast optimism, dispersion, and accuracy as the dependent variable. 
OPTIMISM is the mean earnings forecast immediately before an earnings announcement minus 
actual earnings, scaled by the firm’s stock price at the end of the fiscal quarter. DISPERSION is 
the standard deviation of forecasts measured immediately before an earnings announcement. 
ABSERROR is the absolute value of the difference between the earnings forecast immediately 
before an earnings announcement and actual earnings, scaled by the firm’s stock price at the end 
of the fiscal quarter. Each analyst recommendation and forecast variable is averaged across 
period t in the pre-period and t+1 in the post-period. Given that it is unclear ex ante how lowball 
guidance may be associated with subsequent analyst recommendation and forecast properties, we 
do not make directional predictions for the interaction term. For example, analysts may issue 
very cautious forecasts following a firm’s lowball guidance, or alternatively, analysts may adjust 
their forecasts upward because they perceive the firm’s guidance to be overly cautious. 
We control for various firm and stock characteristics that have been shown in prior 
studies to be associated with institutional ownership and analyst coverage (Healy et al. 1999; 
Bushee and Miller 2012). Firm size (SIZE), growth (SALESGR), profitability (ROA), leverage 
(LEVERAGE), book-to-market (BTM), R&D intensity (RDINTENSE), and age (FIRMAGE) are 
as previously defined. In addition, to control for loss firms, LOSS is an indicator variable set to 
one if a firm’s quarterly net income is negative. Stock characteristics include stock return, 
volatility, and turnover, measured over a given quarter. RET is the log of one plus the cumulative 
                                                 
15 In the IBES scale for analyst stock recommendations, a Strong Buy is coded as 1, followed by 2 for Buy, 3 for 
Hold, 4 for Sell, and 5 for Strong Sell. To facilitate the interpretation, we multiply these values by −1 so that higher 
values correspond to more positive recommendations. 
25 
 
raw return during the fiscal quarter, VOLATILITY is the standard deviation of daily returns 
during the fiscal quarter, and TURNOVER is the log of daily volume scaled by market 
capitalization averaged over the fiscal quarter. All variables are averaged across period t in the 
pre-period and t+1 in the post-period. Detailed variable definitions are included in the appendix, 
and all continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
Table 4 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis of 
the market implications of lowball guidance. The sample size is 1,102 firm-periods, consisting of 
253 lowball firms and 253 control (non-lowball) firms, all measured in both periods t and t+1.  
Table 4 Panel B presents the results from estimating regression Equation (3). We report t-
statistics in parentheses and cluster the standard errors by firm. Panel B shows the results for 
institutional ownership, with aggregate institutional ownership in Column (1) and disaggregated 
institutional ownership in Columns (2) to (4). The interaction term LOWBALL*POST is 
significantly positive at the 0.01 level only in Column (2), where the dependent variable is 
PIH_TRA. This result suggests that firms experience higher levels of transient institutional 
ownership after adopting a lowball guidance policy, relative to non-lowball firms. In terms of 
economic magnitude, the coefficient 0.021 indicates that adoption of a lowball guidance policy is 
associated with an increase in transient institutional ownership by 11.7 percent (0.021/0.179) of 
its mean level. In terms of the control variables, the results are consistent with prior studies that 
find institutional investors generally tend to invest in stocks with higher liquidity and lower 
volatility (e.g., Gompers and Metrick 2001). 
Table 4 Panel C shows the results for analyst coverage in Column (1), recommendations 
in Column (2), and earnings forecast properties in Columns (3) to (5). In Column (1), contrary to 
our prediction, the interaction term is significantly negative at the 0.05 level, suggesting that 
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firms on average lose analyst coverage after adopting a lowball guidance policy, relative to non-
lowball firms. However, the economic magnitude of the coverage drop is not large. The −0.049 
coefficient translates into a 4.9 percent decrease in ANALYSTCOV relative to the mean level of 
coverage, which turns out to be one-half an analyst. In Column (3), where dependent variable is 
OPTIMISM, the interaction term LOWBALL*POST is significantly positive at the 0.05 level, 
suggesting that analysts issue more optimistic earnings forecasts for firms that start providing 
lowball guidance than for non-lowball firms. Finally, in Columns (2), (4) and (5), where the 
dependent variable is MEANREC, DISPERSION and ABSERROR, the interaction term is 
insignificant, suggesting that recommendations and these properties of earnings forecasts are not 
significantly different between lowball and non-lowball firms. 
Overall, the difference-in-differences results in Panels B and C of Table 4 indicate that, 
relative to non-lowball firms, lowball firms on average experience higher ownership by transient 
institutions and more optimistic analyst forecasts after they adopt a lowball guidance policy, 
consistent with the market appeasement explanation that lowball guidance seems to appeal to 
analysts and transient investors. However, there is also evidence on one side-effect that lowball 
firms seem to slightly lose some analyst coverage.  
4.3 Termination of Lowball Guidance 
In Section 3.2, we provide descriptive statistics of how many firms stopped providing 
lowball guidance, by either stopping providing guidance, failing to meet guidance, or exceeding 
guidance by a small margin (less than $0.05) for two or more consecutive quarters. In this 
section, we examine the antecedents of the termination of lowball guidance policy. This analysis 
is parallel to that of Section 4.1 where we examine when and why firms begin to provide lowball 
guidance. 
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We estimate the following logistic regression Equation (4), which is similar to Equation 
(1), except that the dependent variable is an indicator variable for lowball firms’ stoppage of 
lowball guidance (STOP), set to one in the first fiscal quarter in which it stopped lowballing 
(quarter t), and zero for the last fiscal quarter in which it lowballed (quarter t-1). The independent 
variables are also measured in quarters t and t-1, respectively. We use one quarter rather than 
four quarter in this analysis to pinpoint factors associated with the decision to stop lowballing. In 
addition, we partition the stoppage into the three scenarios discussed earlier: guidance no longer 
provided (NOGUIDE), firm failed to meet guidance (DISAPPOINT), and firm exceeded 
guidance by a small margin for two or more quarters (SMALLBEAT).  
Pr(STOPi,t=1) = β0 + β1(SALESGRi,t) + β2(EARNGRi,t) + β3(EARNVOLi,t)  
+ β4(ANALYSTCOVi,t) + β5(PIH_TRAi,t) + β6(PIH_DEDi,t)  
+ β7(PIH_QIXi,t) + β8(SIZEi,t) + β9(ROAi,t) + β10(LEVERAGEi,t)  
+ β11(BTMi,t) + β12(SEOi,t) + β13(M&Ai,t) + β14(RDINTENSEi,t)  
+ Industry Fixed Effects + ɛi,t                                                                       (4) 
 
Table 5 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in Equation (4). 
The sample consists of 586 firm-quarters, corresponding to 293 lowball firms in the quarter that 
they stopped lowballing (t) and the quarter before (t-1). Panel B presents the regression results of 
Equation (4), with all cases of stopping lowball guidance in Column (1) and the three subsamples 
in Columns (2) to (4). We report t-statistics in parentheses and cluster the standard errors by 
firm. The tests of significance are one-tailed for variables with directional predictions and two-
tailed otherwise. In Column (1), where the dependent variable is STOP, the coefficients for 
SALESGR and EARNGR are significantly negative at the 0.01 level, consistent with the 
unexpected growth explanation and suggest that lowball guidance stops when high growth 
moderates. EARNGR is also significantly negative in Columns (2), (3), and (4), where the 
dependent variable are NOGUIDE, DISAPPOINT and SMALLBEAT respectively, suggesting that 
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a decline in earnings growth is a factor for firms to stop lowballing under each scenario. 
Interestingly, NOGUIDE in Column (2) is negatively associated with ANALYSTCOV at the 0.05 
level, whereas DISAPPOINT in column (3) is positively associated with ANALYSTCOV at the 
0.01 level. These results suggest that lowball firms are likely to stop providing guidance 
following a decline in analyst coverage, but they are also more likely to disappoint the market by 
failing to meet their guidance following an increase in analyst coverage. In either scenario, the 
pattern of lowball guidance stops. Overall, we interpret these results to be complementary to the 
results in Table 3, which show that sales growth, earnings growth, and analyst coverage are 
associated with firms’ lowball guidance. 
4.4 Meeting or Beating Analyst Consensus Forecasts 
The results in prior sections indicate that the start of lowballing is positively related to 
growth in sales and earnings, earnings volatility, analyst coverage, and transient institutional 
ownership, consistent with the unexpected growth and market appeasement explanations. Then, 
we found that the end of lowballing is associated with declines in growth and analyst coverage. 
In all these analyses, we compare firms’ reported EPS to the firms’ guidance. In this section, to 
shed further light on the lowball phenomenon, we examine how lowballing is related to meeting 
or beating analyst consensus forecasts. The motivation for this analysis is from our reading of the 
business press (as discussed in Section 3.1), which suggests that one potential incentive for firms 
to provide lowball guidance is to ensure the meeting or beating of analysts’ expectations. 
We examine how often a firm meets or beats the consensus forecast during three periods: 
the four quarters before the lowballing begins (period t-1), the first four quarters after the start of 
lowballing (i.e., beating guidance by at least $0.05) (period t), and the four quarter afterwards 
(period t+1). In each period, we define the percentage of quarters in which the actual reported 
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EPS met or beat (MBE%) or strictly beat (BEAT%) the analyst mean consensus forecast. We use 
these as the dependent variable of the following difference-in-differences regression models, in 
which all variables are defined as before except that POST is set to one for period t and zero for 
period t-1 when we examine the initial effect of lowballing, and it is set to one for period t+1 and 
zero for period t when we examine the ongoing effect of lowballing after it has started.  
    MBE% (or BEAT%),t = β0 + β1(LOWBALLi,t) + β2(POSTi,t) + β3(LOWBALL*POSTi,t)  
+ β4(SALESGRi,t) + β5(ANALYSTCOVi,t) + β6(SIZEi,t) +  β7(ROAi,t)  
+ β8(LEVERAGEi,t) + β9(BTMi,t) + β10(FIRMAGEi,t) + β11(LOSSi,t)  
+ Industry Fixed Effects + ɛi,t              (5) 
 
Table 6 presents the results of this analysis. In columns (1) and (2), where the dependent 
variable is MBE% and BEAT%, respectively, we examine the initial effect of lowballing and find 
the interaction term LOWBALL*POST significantly positive at the 0.01 level. As expected, these 
results indicate that lowball firms are more likely to meet or beat analyst consensus immediately 
after starting lowball guidance, relative to matched non-lowball firms. In contrast, in columns (3) 
and (4), where we examine the ongoing effect of lowballing, we find the opposite result, that is, 
the interaction term LOWBALL*POST is significantly negative at the 0.01 level. This indicates 
that lowball firms are less likely to meet or beat analyst consensus relative to non-lowball firms, 
after they have been lowballing for four quarters.16 
These results, along with those from Table 4 Panel C, paint an interesting picture of how 
analysts react to firms’ lowball guidance. During the initial lowball guidance period, analysts do 
                                                 
16 In addition to exploring how lowball guidance is related to the meeting and beating of analyst consensus, we also 
explore how lowball guidance might be related to the phenomenon of firms’ “walking down” analyst expectations 
documented in prior literature (Richardson et al. 2004; Cotter et al. 2006). In untabulated analysis, we find that the 
guidance provided by lowball firms is not more likely to be below the prevailing analyst consensus than that of non-
lowball firms. In fact, non-lowball firms, including those providing guidance only occasionally, issue guidance 
below the prevailing consensus about 65% of the time, compared to 53% for lowball firms. This also means that 
47% of the time, a lowball firm’s guidance is above or equal to analyst consensus, yet still ends up being overly 
cautious at the earnings announcement. Overall, this evidence suggests that the lowball guidance phenomenon we 
examine in this study is not simply a subset of firms trying to walk down analyst expectations. 
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not fully understand that the guidance is overly cautious, and therefore, their consensus tends to 
be sufficiently low for firms’ actual earnings to exceed. After four quarters of this pattern, 
however, analysts adjust their forecasts higher to become more optimistic, and as a result, it 
becomes more difficult for lowball firms to meet or beat the analyst consensus relative to non-
lowball firms. Overall, these results seem to corroborate our results from the previous section 
examining the termination of lowball guidance. 
4.5 Market Returns of Lowball and Non-Lowball Firms 
 In this subsection, we examine the implication of lowball guidance initiation on a firm’s 
stock performance to test whether issuing lowball guidance is associated with better stock 
performance. In particular, we compare the market returns of lowball firms to matched non-
lowball firms during three one-year periods: the four consecutive quarters of beating guidance by 
at least $0.05 (period t), the one year prior (period t-1), and the one year after (period t+1). The 
matched non-lowball firms are those in our cross-sectional analysis described in Section 4.1.2.  
 Table 7 presents the results. We measure returns as buy-and-hold size-adjusted abnormal 
returns.17 In Panel A, we use annual windows. The mean return during period t-1 and t+1 is not 
significantly different between lowball and non-lowball firms. In contrast, during period t, the 
mean return for lowball firms (28.1 percent) is significantly greater than the mean return for non-
lowball firms (−1.6 percent) at the 0.01 level. The results suggest that lowball firms outperform 
non-lowball firms only during the first four quarters of providing lowball guidance, but not 
before and after that period. To further probe this result, we repeat this analysis using quarterly 
returns shown in Panel B. As before, the returns in periods t-1 and t+1 are all not significantly 
different, while they are higher for lowball firms compared to non-lowball firms in all but one of 
                                                 
17 Results and inferences are similar when we use raw returns. 
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the four quarters during period t (unreported p-value=0.11 for Quarter 2, the only insignificant 
quarter in period t).  
This univariate comparison, however, does not account for the earnings news released 
during the quarter, which may be driving the differences in stock performance. To mitigate this 
concern, we regress the quarterly buy-and-hold abnormal returns on an indicator of lowball firms 
while controlling for the earnings news throughout the quarter (ENEWS_QTR), calculated as the 
actual earnings minus the mean analyst earnings forecast at the beginning of the quarter, scaled 
by the firm’s stock price at the beginning of the quarter. Panel C reports the results. As expected, 
the coefficient on ENEWS_QTR is significantly positive in most quarters, suggesting that indeed 
the return differentials are partially explained by differential amount of earnings news during the 
quarter. More importantly, we continue to find a significantly positive coefficient on the Lowball 
indicator in all but one quarter in period t, but not in period t-1 or t+1. These results suggest that, 
the higher stock outperformance by lowball firms within the first year of lowball initiation is not 
just driven by their better earnings performance, as the unexpected growth explanation implies, 
but is also consistent with the market appeasement explanation that the market reacts positively 
to the issuance of lowball guidance in the first few quarters. Overall, the results in Table 7 
indicate that there is a temporary stock outperformance to providing lowball guidance. 
4.6 Robustness Tests 
As discussed in Section 3, our empirical definition of lowball guidance is based on our 
readings of many business press articles about lowballing. Our choice of a $0.05 earnings-per-
share beat relative to guidance for four consecutive quarters resulted in the identification of 329 
firms or 11.1 percent of our sample firms as lowball firms at some point during our sample 
period. Ample empirical evidence also supports the use of $0.05 rather than, say, $0.06 due to 
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market participants’ tendencies for rounding EPS expectations to nickel increments (Herrmann 
and Thomas 2005; Bamber et al. 2010; Cheong and Thomas (2011); Dechow and You 2012). As 
a robustness check, we repeated our analyses using a $0.06 EPS hurdle to beat for at least four 
consecutive quarters. Increasing the hurdle by one cent results in 253 being identified as lowball 
firms. 
Another design choice we made was using the midpoint of firms’ guidance range to 
measure an EPS beat. However, Ciconte et al. (2011) show that the upper bound rather than the 
midpoint is more likely to represent managers’ true expectations in recent times. Therefore, we 
also repeat our analyses using the upper bound to measure an EPS beat. Using the upper bound 
results in 199 firms being identified as a lowball firm. 
Despite the reduced number of lowball firms from using a $0.06 EPS beat hurdle or the 
upper bound of guidance to measure a $0.05 EPS beat, our inferences from Sections 4, 5, and 6 
remain; namely, lowball guidance is consistent with the unexpected growth and market 
appeasement explanations. 
Finally, we conducted one-to-one matches when matching control firms (non-lowball 
firms) to lowball firms in our main tests. As a robustness check, we also conducted two-to-one 
matches, with and without replacement. We find that the results are similar to or slightly stronger 
than those presented in Table 3, Panel B and Table 4. 
5. Conclusion 
We conduct the first large-sample study to examine lowball guidance, the practice of firm 
managers issuing overly cautious guidance that is subsequently exceeded by a large margin at the 
earnings announcements. This practice has been the subject of debates among investors, analysts, 
and the media, while based only on anecdotes of a few high-profile firms. We develop an 
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intuitive empirical definition to identify and examine this practice within a broad sample of 
firms. We document the prevalence of this practice, and find evidence consistent with two 
drivers of lowballing: firms’ unexpectedly high growth and firms’ attempt to appease sell-side 
analysts and institutional investors. However, we find that the capital market implications of 
lowball guidance are short-lived: the likelihood of meeting and beating analyst consensus and the 
stock returns improve only in the first four quarters after the initiation of lowball guidance, but 
the benefits disappear after four quarters. Therefore, providing overly cautious guidance may 
appeal to certain investors, but it does not seem a sustainable practice. Indeed most lowball firms 
terminate this practice within two years. The findings of our study inform firm managers of the 
pros and cons of such a practice and alerts capital market participants of the ephemeral nature of 
lowball guidance. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
SALEGR Seasonal growth in net sales (COMPUSTAT SALEQ) averaged over the four quarters of period 
t-1, period t, or period t+1. 
EARNGR Seasonal growth in operating earnings (COMPUSTAT IBQ) averaged over the four quarters of 
period t-1, period t, or period t+1. 
EARNVOL Standard deviation of quarterly reported earnings during the prior five years, averaged over the 
four quarters of period t-1, period t, or period t+1. 
ANALYSTCOV The natural log of one plus the number of unique analysts who issued an EPS forecast for the 
firm during the fiscal quarter averaged over the four quarters of period t-1, period t, or period 
t+1. 
PIH The percentage of common shares outstanding held by institutional investors as of the end of the 
latest calendar quarter averaged over the four quarters of period t-1, period t, or period t+1. 
PIH_TRA The percentage of common shares outstanding held by transient institutional investors as of the 
end of the latest calendar quarter averaged over the four quarters of period t-1, period t, or period 
t+1. We follow Bushee and Noe (2000) and Bushee (2001) to partition the ownership by 
institutional investors into three types: transient, dedicated, and quasi-indexer. 
PIH_DED The percentage of common shares outstanding held by dedicated institutional investors as of the 
end of the latest calendar quarter averaged over the four quarters of period t-1, period t, or period 
t+1. We follow Bushee and Noe (2000) and Bushee (2001) to partition the ownership by 
institutional investors into three types: transient, dedicated, and quasi-indexer. 
PIH_QIX The percentage of common shares outstanding held by quasi-indexer institutional investors as of 
the end of the latest calendar quarter averaged over the four quarters of period t-1, period t, or 
period t+1. We follow Bushee and Noe (2000) and Bushee (2001) to partition the ownership by 
institutional investors into three types: transient, dedicated, and quasi-indexer. 
SIZE The natural log of the market cap (Compustat PRCCQ*CSHOQ) averaged over the four quarters 
of period t-1, period t, or period t+1. 
ROA Return on average assets averaged over the four quarters of period t-1, period t, or period t+1. 
Return on average assets equals the income before extraordinary items (Compustat IBQ) divided 
by the average total assets (Compustat ATQ) at the beginning and the end of the quarter. 
LEVERAGE Debt (Compustat DLCQ+DLTTQ) to equity (Compustat CEQQ) ratio averaged over the four 
quarters of period t-1, period t, or period t+1. 
BTM Book (Compustat CEQQ) to market (Compustat PRCCQ*CSHOQ) ratio averaged over the four 
quarters of period t-1, period t, or period t+1. We set its value to zero when negative. 
SEO Seasoned equity offering indicator averaged over the four quarters of period t-1, period t, or 
period t+1. Seasoned equity offering indicator is set to one when proceeds from the sale of 
common and preferred stock (Compustat SSTKQ) in current and the subsequent three quarters is 
greater than 10 percent of beginning total assets, and set to zero otherwise. 
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Appendix: Variable Definitions (continued) 
 
Variable Definition 
M&A Merger and acquisition indicator averaged over the four quarters of period t-1, period t, or 
period t+1. Merger and acquisition indicator is set to one if the amount of acquisitions 
(Compustat AQCQ)  in current and the subsequent three quarters is greater than 10 percent of 
beginning total assets, and set to zero otherwise. 
RDINTENSE Research and development intensity averaged over the four quarters of period t or period t+1. 
Research and development intensity equals research and development expense (Compustat 
XRDQ) during the fiscal quarter divided by the average total assets (Compustat ATQ) at the 
beginning and the end of the quarter. 
IFIRST_GUIDE Indicator variable set to 1 if a firm is providing guidance for the first time in the first quarter of 
the four quarters of period t or period t+1. 
FIRMAGE The natural log of the number of years since the firm first appears in CRSP averaged over the 
four quarters of period t or period t+1. 
FQ4 Indicator variable set to 1 if the last quarter in period t is the fiscal fourth quarter. 
LOSS Indicator of a loss (Compustat NIQ<0) averaged over the four quarters of period t or period t+1. 
RET Cumulative return during the fiscal quarter, averaged over the four quarters of period t or period 
t+1. 
VOLATILITY Standard deviation of daily returns over the fiscal quarter, averaged over the four quarters of 
period t or period t+1. 
TURNOVER The natural log of the average daily US$ trading volume during the fiscal quarter divided by the 
market cap averaged over the four quarters of period t or period t+1. 
MEANREC Mean recommendation among analysts for a given firm immediately prior to an earnings 
announcement averaged over the four quarters of period t or period t+1. The scale of mean 
consensus recommendation from IBES is as follows: 1-Strong Buy, 2-Buy, 3-Hold, 4-
Underperform. 5-Sell. We take the negative value so that lower (higher) value indicates more 
negative (positive) opinion.  
OPTIMISM Analyst forecast optimism averaged over the four quarters of period t or period t+1. Forecast 
optimism is measured as the mean earnings forecast immediately before an earnings 
announcement minus actual earnings, scaled by the firm’s stock price at the end of the fiscal 
quarter. 
DISPERSION Standard deviation of analyst forecasts measured immediately before an earnings 
announcement, averaged over the four quarters of period t or period t+1.  
ABSERROR The absolute value of the difference between the analyst mean earnings forecast immediately 
before an earnings announcement and actual earnings, scaled by the firm’s stock price at the end 
of the fiscal quarter, averaged over the four quarters of period t or period t+1. 
ENEWS_QTR The total amount of earnings news released during the fiscal quarter. It is calculated as the 
actual earnings minus the analyst mean earnings forecast at the beginning of the fiscal quarter, 
scaled by the firm’s stock price at the beginning of the fiscal quarter.  
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Figure 1: Number of New Lowball Firms Identified Each Quarter 
 
Figure 2: Number of All Lowball Firms (New and Continuing) Each Quarter 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the number of newly-identified lowball firms in each quarter, with a median of four and a high of 16 in 2009Q4. Figure 2 shows the 
cumulative number of lowball firms each quarter, with the median of 21 and the high of 48 in 2010Q2. 
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Table 1: Sample Composition 
 
 
  
Number of  
guidance 
Number of 
Unique Firms 
All point and range quarterly EPS guidance in IBES from 2001Q1 to 2017Q4 58,378 3,938 
     Eliminate guidance issued after the end of the fiscal quarter (7,773) (678) 
     Eliminate guidance issued before the start of the fiscal quarter (4,150) (57) 
     If multiple guidance issued in the fiscal quarter, retain the last one (5,340) (0) 
     Require non-missing data from IBES, Compustat, and CRSP (1,452) (200) 
     Eliminate firms with guidance or actual EPS greater than $20.00 ever (98) (6) 
Subtotal of management guidance and unique firms 39,565 2,997 
   
Retain all firm-quarters for firms that provided at least one EPS guidance 128,063 2,997 
     Require four consecutive firm-quarters with non-missing data,  
     starting after 2001Q1 (9,964) (44) 
Total number of firm-quarters and unique firms used to identify potential 
Lowball guidance firms 118,099 2,953 
 
Table 1 outlines our sample selection procedure. We obtain quarterly earnings-per-share (EPS) guidance data from 
the Thomson Reuters IBES Guidance Detail file. 
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Table 2: Time-Series Determinants of Lowball Guidance 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Time-Series Regressions 
Variable N Mean Min 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Max 
SALEGR 602 0.156 −0.314 0.017 0.104 0.241 1.202 
EARNGR 602 0.153 −2.829 −0.320 0.138 0.603 3.679 
EARNVOL 602 0.235 0.026 0.094 0.159 0.274 1.835 
ANALYSTCOV (not logged) 602 12.126 1.250 6.250 10.000 17.000 35.500 
ANALYSTCOV 602 2.400 0.811 1.981 2.398 2.890 3.597 
PIH 602 0.748 0.000 0.661 0.829 0.920 1.000 
PIH_TRA 602 0.187 0.000 0.112 0.175 0.249 0.483 
PIH_DED 602 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.011 0.063 0.222 
PIH_QIX 602 0.496 0.000 0.373 0.527 0.638 0.924 
SIZE 602 7.551 4.523 6.633 7.384 8.436 11.318 
ROA 602 0.015 −0.074 0.006 0.016 0.028 0.081 
LEVERAGE 602 0.543 −7.679 0.028 0.346 0.764 8.333 
BTM 602 0.462 0.000 0.239 0.398 0.596 1.750 
SEO 602 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
M&A 602 0.120 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
RDINTENSE 602 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.022 0.061 
IFIRST_GUIDE 602 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
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Table 2: Time-Series Determinants of Lowball Guidance (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Time-Series Logistic Regressions 
  Unexp.. Mkt  
Dependent variable = 
 Lowball 
  Growth Appease (1) (2) 
SALEGR +   1.108 *** 1.001 ** 
 
    (2.62)   (2.31)   
EARNGR +   0.120 ** 0.123 ** 
 
    (1.92)   (1.96)   
EARNVOL +   0.452 *** 0.443 *** 
 
    (3.26)   (3.10)   
ANALYSTCOV   + −0.032   −0.105   
 
    (−0.33)   (−1.00)   
PIH   + 0.218 *    
 
    (1.34)      
PIH_TRA   +    1.435 *** 
 
       (2.45)   
PIH_DED   −    −1.401 * 
 
       (−1.35)   
PIH_QIX   −    −0.198   
 
       (−0.82)   
SIZE     0.073 * 0.121 ** 
 
    (1.72)   (2.51)   
ROA     8.971 *** 9.102 *** 
 
    (3.27)   (3.16)   
LEVERAGE     0.021   0.024   
 
    (0.54)   (0.58)   
BTM     0.173   0.217   
 
    (0.91)   (1.12)   
SEO     −0.537   −0.551   
 
    (−0.90)   (−0.95)   
M&A     −0.929 *** −0.939 *** 
 
    (−2.91)   (−2.92)   
RDINTENSE     4.282   4.575   
 
    (1.41)   (1.46)   
IFIRST_GUIDE     −0.793   −0.945   
 
    (−1.26)   (−1.37)   
Intercept     −1.148 *** −1.304 *** 
 
    (−3.38)   (−3.78)   
FF 12 Industry FE     Yes Yes 
Clustered by firm     Yes Yes 
N     602 602 
Pseudo-R2     0.044 0.047 
 
Table 2 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in Equation (1). The sample size is 602 firm-
periods, consisting of 301 lowball firms measured during periods t-1 and t. Panel B reports the results from the time-
series logistic regressions of Equation (1) with the institutional ownership aggregated (PIH) in Column (1) and 
partitioned into transient (PIH_TRA), dedicated (PIH_DED), and quasi-indexer (PIH_QIX) in Column (2). We 
report t-statistics in parentheses and cluster the standard errors by firm. The tests of significance are one-tailed for 
variables with directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. The appendix includes detailed definitions for all 
variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers, 
with the exception of earnings growth (EARNGR), which is winsorized at the 5th and 95th percentiles due to a small 
denominator problem. *, **, *** indicate significant difference from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, 
respectively.  
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Table 3: Cross-Sectional Determinants of Lowball Guidance 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Cross-Sectional Regressions 
 
Variable N Mean Min 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Max 
SALEGR 602 0.155 −0.421 0.012 0.102 0.246 1.198 
EARNGR 602 −0.014 −4.395 −0.470 0.113 0.552 3.469 
EARNVOL 602 0.247 0.025 0.084 0.143 0.254 2.278 
ANALYSTCOV (not logged) 602 11.990 0.000 6.000 10.000 16.500 45.750 
ANALYSTCOV 602 2.369 0.693 1.946 2.398 2.862 3.651 
PIH 602 0.734 0.000 0.648 0.815 0.909 1.000 
PIH_TRA 602 0.181 0.000 0.109 0.173 0.247 0.457 
PIH_DED 602 0.036 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.061 0.231 
PIH_QIX 602 0.487 0.000 0.374 0.511 0.634 0.890 
SIZE 602 7.574 4.602 6.676 7.429 8.471 11.318 
ROA 602 0.013 −0.065 0.003 0.015 0.025 0.084 
LEVERAGE 602 0.692 −5.079 0.033 0.355 0.871 10.735 
BTM 602 0.458 0.000 0.244 0.399 0.587 1.666 
SEO 602 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
M&A 602 0.114 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
RDINTENSE 602 0.011 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.018 0.061 
IFIRST_GUIDE 602 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
FIRMAGE 602 2.756 0.693 2.225 2.788 3.332 4.516 
FQ4 602 0.304 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
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Table 3: Cross−Sectional Determinants of Lowball Guidance (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Cross-Sectional Regressions 
 
  Unexp.. Mkt  
Dependent variable = 
 Lowball 
  Growth Appease (1) (2) 
SALEGR +   0.696 ** 0.641 * 
 
    (1.76)   (1.60)   
EARNGR +   0.147 *** 0.152 *** 
 
    (2.49)   (2.58)   
EARNVOL +   0.436 * 0.431 * 
 
    (1.63)   (1.62)   
ANALYSTCOV   + 0.337 * 0.282   
 
    (1.52)   (1.27)   
PIH   + 0.731 **    
 
    (1.81)      
PIH_TRA   +    2.512 *** 
 
       (2.58)   
PIH_DED   −    1.069   
 
       (0.55)   
PIH_QIX   −    0.090   
 
       (0.18)   
SIZE     −0.066   −0.029   
 
    (−0.57)   (−0.24)   
ROA     23.092 *** 24.503 *** 
 
    (4.26)   (4.35)   
LEVERAGE     −0.028   −0.031   
 
    (−0.48)   (−0.54)   
BTM     0.704 ** 0.798 ** 
 
    (1.97)   (2.19)   
SEO     −0.487   −0.629   
 
    (−0.72)   (−0.91)   
M&A     −0.993 *** −1.002 ** 
 
    (−2.59)   (−2.55)   
RDINTENSE     19.517 ** 19.676 ** 
 
    (2.20)   (2.20)   
IFIRST_GUIDE     1.054   0.980   
 
    (1.46)   (1.33)   
FIRMAGE     −0.106   −0.079   
 
    (−0.76)   (−0.55)   
FQ4     0.405 ** 0.404 ** 
 
    (2.06)   (2.06)   
Intercept     −1.563 ** −1.833 ** 
 
    (−1.97)   (−2.24)   
FF 12 Industry FE     Yes Yes 
Clustered by firm     Yes Yes 
N     602 602 
Pseudo-R2     0.086 0.092 
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Table 3: Cross-Sectional Determinants of Lowball Guidance (Cont’d) 
 
Table 3 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the variables in Equation (2). The sample size is 602 firm-
periods, consisting of 301 lowball firms and 301 control (non-lowball) firms, each measured during period t. Panel 
B reports the results from the cross-sectional regressions of Equation (2) with the institutional ownership aggregated 
(PIH) in Column (1) and separated into transient (PIH_TRA), dedicated (PIH_DED), and quasi-indexer (PIH_QIX) 
in Column (2). We report t-statistics in parentheses and cluster the standard errors by firm. The tests of significance 
are one-tailed for variables with directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. The appendix includes detailed 
definitions for all variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the 
influence of outliers, with the exception of earnings growth (EARNGR), which is winsorized at the 5th and 95th 
percentiles due to a small denominator problem. *, **, *** indicate significant difference from zero at the 0.10, 
0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4: Market Implications of Lowball Guidance 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in the Regressions of Market Implications 
Variable N Mean Min 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Max 
PIH 1,012 0.744 0.000 0.655 0.824 0.915 1.000 
PIH_TRA 1,012 0.179 0.000 0.108 0.169 0.245 0.456 
PIH_DED 1,012 0.030 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.051 0.197 
PIH_QIX 1,012 0.508 0.000 0.420 0.531 0.649 0.895 
ANALYSTCOV (not logged) 1,012 11.661 0.750 6.000 10.000 15.750 35.500 
ANALYSTCOV 1,012 2.355 0.560 1.946 2.398 2.818 3.597 
MEANREC 996 −2.304 −3.393 −2.591 −2.285 −2.001 −1.250 
OPTIMISM 988 −0.002 −0.052 −0.002 −0.001 0.000 0.041 
DISPERSION 964 0.031 0.000 0.010 0.018 0.030 0.355 
ABSERROR 988 0.008 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.321 
SALEGR 1,012 0.141 −0.421 0.022 0.102 0.223 1.049 
SIZE 1,012 7.570 4.596 6.697 7.515 8.387 11.320 
ROA 1,012 0.014 −0.073 0.005 0.015 0.026 0.078 
LEVERAGE 1,012 0.739 −3.813 0.041 0.355 0.845 11.213 
BTM 1,012 0.466 0.000 0.253 0.406 0.605 1.689 
FIRMAGE 1,012 2.814 0.693 2.303 2.803 3.438 4.527 
RDINTENSE 1,012 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.016 0.062 
LOSS 1,012 0.0158 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.250 1.000 
RET 1,012 0.031 −0.201 −0.010 0.030 0.078 0.216 
VOLATILITY 1,012 0.024 0.010 0.016 0.022 0.028 0.064 
TURNOVER 1,012 −4.705 −6.403 −5.102 −4.715 −4.297 −3.191 
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Table 4: Market Implications of Lowball Guidance (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Subsequent Institutional Ownership 
    Dependent Variables 
 
Mkt  PIH PIH_TRA PIH_DED PIH_QIX 
  Appease (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LOWBALL   0.020   0.004   0.005   0.008   
 
  (0.94)   (0.50)   (1.10)   (0.46)   
POST   −0.007   −0.010 ** −0.004 ** 0.007   
 
  (−0.71)   (−2.11)   (−2.17)   (0.77)   
LOWBALL*POST + 0.010   0.021 *** −0.004   −0.003   
 
  (0.79)   (3.05)   (−1.40)   (−0.25)   
SALEGR   −0.033   0.019   −0.020 ** −0.022   
 
  (−0.68)   (1.11)   (−2.46)   (−0.59)   
ANALYSTCOV   0.004   0.002   −0.008 * 0.005   
 
  (0.15)   (0.25)   (−1.84)   (0.24)   
SIZE   −0.035 ** −0.020 *** 0.004 * −0.022 * 
 
  (−2.48)   (−3.96)   (1.85)   (−1.96)   
ROA   −0.609   −0.387 * 0.042   −0.185   
 
  (−0.97)   (−1.71)   (0.26)   (−0.37)   
LEVERAGE   0.004   0.000   0.003 * 0.002   
 
  (0.63)   (0.02)   (1.95)   (0.31)   
BTM   −0.052   −0.028 * −0.019 ** 0.006   
 
  (−1.15)   (−1.81)   (−2.51)   (0.18)   
RDINTENSE   0.826   0.247   −0.101   0.669   
 
  (0.75)   (0.62)   (−0.69)   (0.81)   
FIRMAGE   0.028 * −0.002   0.002   0.029 ** 
 
  (1.87)   (−0.35)   (0.71)   (2.34)   
LOSS   −0.077   −0.019   0.022 ** −0.089 ** 
 
  (−1.33)   (−0.99)   (2.19)   (−1.97)   
RET   −0.019   0.156 *** −0.036 * −0.104   
 
  (−0.17)   (3.30)   (−1.94)   (−1.20)   
VOLATILITY   −5.905 *** −0.516   −0.709 *** −4.401 *** 
 
  (−5.15)   (−1.34)   (−3.68)   (−4.63)   
TURNOVER   0.124 *** 0.066 *** −0.000   0.067 *** 
 
  (5.93)   (8.77)   (−0.05)   (4.15)   
Intercept   1.711 *** 0.664 *** 0.041   1.032 *** 
 
  (10.40)   (11.03)   (1.50)   (7.84)   
FF 12 Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered by firm   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N   1,012 1,012 1,012 1,012 
R2   0.166 0.257 0.107 0.131 
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Table 4: Market Implications of Lowball Guidance (Cont’d) 
 
Panel C: Subsequent Analyst Coverage, Recommendation, and Forecast Properties 
    Dependent Variables 
  Mkt  ANALYSTCOV   MEANREC ANAOPT DISPERSE ABSERROR 
  Appease (1) Pred (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LOWBALL   0.008     −0.009   −0.004 *** −0.001   −0.000   
    (0.22)     (−0.24)   (−5.54)   (−0.44)   (−0.01)   
POST   0.009     0.008   −0.000   0.004 *** 0.002   
    (0.66)     (0.36)   (−0.53)   (2.73)   (1.02)   
LOWBALL*POST + −0.049 ** +/− 0.037   0.002 ** −0.004   −0.002   
    (−2.39)     (1.18)   (2.46)   (−1.48)   (−1.21)   
SALEGR   −0.051     0.489 *** 0.001   0.007   0.007   
    (−0.83)     (6.98)   (0.47)   (0.66)   (0.76)   
PIH   0.010     0.041   0.003 * −0.012   −0.006   
    (0.15)     (0.58)   (1.75)   (−1.50)   (−0.99)   
SIZE   0.355 ***   −0.016   0.000   −0.004 * −0.003 * 
    (22.26)     (−0.97)   (1.41)   (−1.67)   (−1.96)   
ROA   −2.832 **   0.947   −0.013   −0.177   −0.101   
    (−2.49)     (0.73)   (−0.48)   (−1.41)   (−0.89)   
LEVERAGE   −0.002     0.003   −0.000   0.000   0.000   
    (−0.18)     (0.32)   (−0.83)   (0.18)   (0.04)   
BTM   0.110     −0.159 ** −0.005 ** −0.009   0.002   
    (1.46)     (−2.06)   (−2.45)   (−0.71)   (0.28)   
RDINTENSE   3.875 **   −4.427 *** −0.091 ** −0.361 * −0.060   
    (2.51)     (−2.88)   (−2.24)   (−1.69)   (−0.40)   
FIRMAGE   −0.101 ***   0.009   0.000   0.011 *** 0.003 ** 
    (−3.70)     (0.30)   (0.73)   (3.07)   (2.08)   
LOSS   0.034     −0.055   −0.000   0.035 *** 0.020 ** 
    (0.37)     (−0.59)   (−0.10)   (3.16)   (2.20)   
RET   0.150     0.094   −0.011 ** −0.038   −0.027   
    (0.77)     (0.45)   (−2.19)   (−1.55)   (−1.35)   
VOLATILITY   −3.411     2.336   0.024   0.044   0.364   
    (−1.58)     (1.14)   (0.47)   (0.19)   (1.43)   
TURNOVER   0.296 ***   −0.043   −0.000   0.016 *** 0.001   
    (9.32)     (−1.36)   (−0.23)   (3.72)   (0.20)   
Intercept   1.454 ***   −2.534 *** −0.004   0.124 *** 0.021   
    (5.65)     (−8.92)   (−0.67)   (3.24)   (0.60)   
FF 12 Industry FE   Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered by firm   Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N   1,012   996 988 964 988 
R2   0.638   0.138 0.123 0.245 0.207 
 
Table 4 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analysis of the market implications of 
lowball guidance. The sample size is 1,102 firm-periods, consisting of 301 lowball firms, 301 control (non-lowball) 
firms, and each measured for periods t and t+1. Panel B presents the results from estimating regression Equation (3). 
Panel C shows the results for analyst coverage in Column (1), stock recommendations in Column (2), and earnings 
forecast properties in Columns (3) to (5). We report t-statistics in parentheses and cluster the standard errors by firm. 
The tests of significance are one-tailed for variables with directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. The 
appendix includes detailed definitions for all variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers. *, **, *** indicate significant difference from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, 
and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
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Table 5: Termination of Lowball Guidance 
 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used in Termination Regressions 
Variable N Mean Min 25th Pctl Median 75th Pctl Max 
SALEGR 586 0.160 −0.438 0.015 0.109 0.254 1.518 
EARNGR 586 0.057 −2.291 −0.295 0.099 0.494 2.132 
EARNVOL 586 0.275 0.035 0.127 0.201 0.322 1.848 
ANALYSTCOV (not logged) 586 12.440 0.000 6.000 11.000 17.000 55.000 
ANALYSTCOV 586 2.424 0.693 1.946 2.485 2.890 3.526 
PIH 586 0.749 0.000 0.660 0.834 0.933 1.000 
PIH_TRA 586 0.191 0.000 0.113 0.176 0.263 0.503 
PIH_DED 586 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.215 
PIH_QIX 586 0.502 0.000 0.394 0.539 0.654 0.935 
SIZE 586 7.719 4.299 6.774 7.658 8.741 12.023 
ROA 586 0.019 −0.099 0.007 0.018 0.035 0.114 
LEVERAGE 586 0.720 −6.971 0.002 0.276 0.782 16.820 
BTM 586 0.447 0.000 0.206 0.358 0.598 1.926 
SEO 586 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
M&A 586 0.137 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
RDINTENSE 586 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.018 0.069 
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Table 5: Termination of Lowball Guidance (Cont’d) 
 
Panel B: Determinants of Termination of Lowball Guidance 
      Dependent Variables 
 
Unexp. Mkt  STOP NOGUIDE DISAPPOINT SMALLBEAT 
  Growth Appease (1) (2) (3) (4) 
SALEGR −   −0.646 *** 0.030   −0.825 ** −0.847 ** 
 
    (−2.74)   (0.04)   (−1.74)   (−2.17)   
EARNGR −   −0.263 *** −0.485 ** −0.295 ** −0.232 * 
 
    (−2.78)   (−1.68)   (−1.81)   (−1.35)   
EARNVOL −   0.029   −0.049   0.159   −0.240   
 
    (0.32)   (−0.18)   (1.08)   (−0.67)   
ANALYSTCOV   − 0.125 
 
−0.787 ** 0.511 *** 0.117   
 
    (1.40)   (−2.13)   (2.72)   (0.76)   
PIH_TRA   − 0.235   1.737 * −0.599   0.713   
 
    (0.53)   (1.69)   (−0.70)   (0.78)   
PIH_DED   
 
−0.512   −0.226   1.029   −0.571   
 
   (−0.56)   (−0.12)   (0.50)   (−0.32)   
PIH_QIX   
 
0.104   −0.542   0.554 * −0.267   
 
  
 
(0.64)   (−1.11)   (1.74)   (−0.78)   
SIZE   
 
0.016   0.304 * −0.153 * 0.049   
 
  
 
(0.38)   (1.86)   (−1.77)   (0.74)   
ROA   
 
−1.071   −1.688   0.937   3.667   
 
  
 
(−0.43)   (−0.26)   (0.19)   (0.85)   
LEVERAGE   
 
−0.024   0.020   −0.182 ** −0.051   
 
  
 
(−1.20)   (0.72)   (−2.44)   (−1.15)   
BTM   
 
0.143   −0.106   0.414   0.469 * 
 
  
 
(1.01)   (−0.33)   (1.50)   (1.85)   
SEO   
 
0.451   1.468 * 0.482 *** −0.309   
 
  
 
(1.47)   (1.77)   (2.85)   (−0.47)   
M&A   
 
0.088   1.055 ** 0.021   −0.021   
 
  
 
(0.56)   (2.07)   (0.08)   (−0.08)   
RDINTENSE   
 
−4.416   −5.550   −8.915   −0.093   
 
  
 
(−1.21)   (−0.52)   (−1.26)   (−0.01)   
Intercept   
 
−0.411 * −0.684   −0.291   −0.540   
 
  
 
(−1.78)   (−0.98)   (−0.54)   (−1.33)   
FF 12 Industry FE   
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered by firm   
 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N   
 
586 148 234 204 
Pseudo-R2    0.023 0.063 0.040 0.021 
 
Table 5 Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used in Equation (4). The sample size is 586 firm-
periods, consisting of 293 lowball firms that stopped lowballing, measured for quarter t and t-1. Panel B presents the 
regression results of Equation (4), with all cases of termination of lowball guidance in Column (1) and the three 
subsamples in Columns (2) to (4). We report t-statistics in parentheses and cluster the standard errors by firm. The 
tests of significance are one-tailed for variables with directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. The appendix 
includes detailed definitions for all variables. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles 
to mitigate the influence of outliers, with the exception of earnings growth (EARNGR), which is winsorized at the 
5th and 95th percentiles due to a small denominator problem. *, **, *** indicate significant difference from zero at 
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 6: Likelihood of Meeting or Beating Analyst Consensus Forecast 
 
    Set t-1(t) as the pre(post)period Set t(t+1) as the pre(post)period 
 
  Dependent Variables Dependent Variables 
 
  MBE% BEAT% MBE% BEAT% 
  Pred. (1) (2) (3) (4) 
LOWBALL   0.064 *** 0.117 *** 0.223 *** 0.333 *** 
 
  (3.20)   (5.32)   (12.47)   (15.66)   
POST   0.004   0.019   −0.000   0.004   
 
  (0.19)   (0.89)   (−0.01)   (0.19)   
LOWBALL*POST +/− 0.155 *** 0.215 *** −0.138 *** −0.169 *** 
 
  (6.82)   (8.18)   (−5.95)   (−6.33)   
SALEGR   0.101 *** 0.116 *** 0.089 *** 0.076 ** 
 
  (3.83)   (3.75)   (2.82)   (2.06)   
ANALYSTCOV   0.067 *** 0.030   0.050 ** 0.009   
 
  (3.53)   (1.49)   (2.11)   (0.37)   
SIZE   0.005   0.020 ** 0.019 * 0.027 ** 
 
  (0.59)   (2.01)   (1.78)   (2.27)   
ROA   0.207   0.277   −0.307   −0.100   
 
  (0.40)   (0.51)   (−0.47)   (−0.14)   
LEVERAGE   0.002   0.001   0.003   0.003   
 
  (0.67)   (0.18)   (0.69)   (0.55)   
BTM   −0.056 ** −0.055 ** −0.025   −0.016   
 
  (−2.07)   (−1.99)   (−0.63)   (−0.41)   
FIRMAGE   −0.026 ** −0.034 *** −0.025 ** −0.032 ** 
 
  (−2.52)   (−2.97)   (−2.10)   (−2.39)   
LOSS   −0.146 *** −0.104 ** −0.162 *** −0.121 ** 
 
  (−3.55)   (−2.43)   (−3.21)   (−2.21)   
Intercept   0.651 *** 0.496 *** 0.544 *** 0.483 *** 
 
  (10.81)   (7.79)   (7.74)   (6.08)   
FF 12 Industry FE   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustered by firm   Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N   1,204 1,204 1,012 1,012 
R2   0.297 0.336 0.292 0.314 
 
Table 6 presents the regression results of Equation (5), where the dependent variables are the percentage of quarters 
in which a firms meets or beats (MBE%) or strictly beats (BEAT%) analyst consensus forecasts. In Columns (1) and 
(2), the sample size is 1,204 firm-periods, consisting of 301 lowball firms and 301 control (non-lowball) firms, 
measured for periods t and t-1. As in prior analyses, each period consists of four consecutive quarters, with the first 
quarter of lowballing as the beginning of period t. In Columns (3) and (4), because of the additional data 
requirement for the four quarters of period t+1, the sample size is slightly smaller: 1,102 firm-periods, consisting of 
253 lowball firms and 253 control (non-lowball) firms, measured for periods t and t+1. We report t-statistics in 
parentheses and cluster the standard errors by firm. The tests of significance are one-tailed for variables with 
directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. The appendix includes detailed definitions for all variables. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to mitigate the influence of outliers. *, **, *** 
indicate significant difference from zero at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 7: Market Returns of Lowball and Non-Lowball Firms 
 
Panel A: Annual Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
    N Lowball Firms Non-Lowball Firms Diff.   
Annual Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns       
Period t-1 301 4.7% 6.0% −1.3% 
 Period t 301 28.1% −1.6% 29.6% *** 
Period t+1 253 5.8% 1.8% 4.0%   
 
Panel B: Quarterly Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
    N Lowball Firms Non-Lowball Firms Diff.   
Quarterly Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
   Period t-1 Quarter -4 301 −0.4% 0.7% −1.1%   
 
Quarter -3 301 2.1% 1.5% 0.6% 
 
 
Quarter -2 301 1.9% 1.8% 0.0% 
   Quarter -1 301 1.3% 1.4% −0.1%   
Period t Quarter 0 301 3.3% 0.8% 2.5% ** 
 
Quarter 1 301 5.1% −0.5% 5.6% *** 
 
Quarter 2 301 2.8% 1.0% 1.8% 
   Quarter 3 301 1.8% −1.1% 2.9% *** 
Period t+1 Quarter 4 253 2.1% 1.0% 1.1%   
 
Quarter 5 253 0.5% 1.4% −1.0% 
 
 
Quarter 6 253 −0.6% −0.3% −0.3% 
   Quarter 7 253 0.3% 0.8% −0.5%   
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Table 7: Market Returns of Lowball and Non-Lowball Firms (Cont’d) 
 
Panel C: Quarterly Buy-and Hold Abnormal Returns Controlling for Earnings News during the Quarter 
 
Dependent variable: 1-Quarter Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns 
    
Mkt Appease 
(Lowball Coeff.) Lowball ENEWS_QTR Intercept N R2 
Period t-1 Quarter -4 +/− −0.011   1.337 * 0.009   602 0.020 
 
    (−0.97)   (1.80)   (1.16)     
 
 
Quarter −3 +/− 0.003   1.537 *** 0.019 ** 602 0.031 
 
    (0.21)   (3.30)   (2.02)     
 
 
Quarter −2 +/− 0.000   0.635   0.020 ** 602 0.009 
 
    (0.04)   (1.18)   (2.45)     
 
 
Quarter −1 +/− −0.001   1.441 *** 0.019 ** 602 0.040 
      (−0.07)   (3.65)   (2.19)       
Period t Quarter 0 + 0.020 ** 1.113 ** 0.011   602 0.022 
 
    (1.74)   (2.40)   (1.21)     
 
 
Quarter 1 + 0.053 *** 0.325   −0.004   602 0.041 
 
    (4.65)   (0.70)   (−0.45)     
 
 
Quarter 2 + 0.014   0.482   0.012   602 0.008 
 
    (1.22)   (1.10)   (1.46)     
 
 
Quarter  3 + 0.016 * 1.747 *** −0.005   602 0.066 
      (1.41)   (3.95)   (−0.63)       
Period t+1 Quarter 4 +/− 0   0.908 * 0.012   506 0.016 
 
    (0.56)   (1.71)   (1.35)     
 
 
Quarter 5 +/− −0.015   1.292 ** 0.018 ** 506 0.033 
 
    (−1.28)   (2.54)   (2.06)     
 
 
Quarter 6 +/− −0.005   1.015 * −0.000   506 0.015 
 
    (−0.42)   (1.68)   (−0.01)     
 
 
Quarter  7 +/− −0.008   0.743 ** 0.013   506 0.016 
      (−0.75)   (1.99)   (1.50)       
 
Table 7 Panel A presents the size-adjusted abnormal returns of lowball and non-lowball firms during three one-year 
periods: the four consecutive quarters of beating guidance by at least $0.05 (period t), the one year prior (period t-1), 
and the one year after (period t+1). Panel B presents the results from a similar analysis on a quarterly basis. Panel C 
reports results of OLS regressions where the dependent variable is the quarterly buy-and-hold abnormal returns and 
the independent variable is an indicator of lowball firms with a control variable of the total amount of earnings news 
released during the quarter (ENEWS_QTR), as defined in the Appendix. The tests of significance are one-tailed for 
variables with directional predictions and two-tailed otherwise. *, **, *** indicate significant difference from zero 
at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.  
